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Human beings are social beings and it is therefore in our nature to act together. It is extremely rare that individuals choose to live their lives in isolation from other human beings. Acting together is even more natural, so to speak, when those involved see that their acting together produces an output that is superior to that which they could produce acting alone. And, for the same token, the company ceases to exist voluntarily if the value of its performance is inferior to that which would derive from separate individual performances. So, if a group of people can naturally work together and have jointly the necessary specialist skills not just to produce a widget, but to produce it better as they would if working separately, why the need for a general manager who will not contribute directly to the production of the widget? The answer must lie in the ability of the general manager to make the group perform together better than they would otherwise. If that is the case, then the expertise that the general manager adds to the group is that of collective performance (in the making of widgets). The job of general manager is not that of a generalist (as the name may suggest), let alone a "jack of all trades", but rather that of a highly specialized individual, knowledgeable of how individuals work together for some collective production and capable of intervening to improve such collective performance. The expertise of a general manager necessarily includes the uncommon knowledge of how individuals perform collectively and of how to improve such collective performance in the case of widgets -that is, to know "the business", the "domain" of the company. There is no such thing as the generic general manager: being a capable general manager in one business does not imply being a capable manager is any business. The job of general manager is therefore doubly specialized. The common notion that general managers exist to manage functional managers (production, sales, finance, and so on) is incomplete in the sense that the contributions of functional units do not constitute externally separable collective performances. Or, put otherwise, the performance of a functional unit is internal (i.e., organizationally inseparable) and therefore dependent on the general manager. A competent functional manager may well be inapt as general manager exactly because the competence of a functional manager exists is subject to the competence of a general manager. One can only know if one can be a general manager by being a general manager. In order to further understand how general management matters, we need a model to describe a company's performance.
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A major limitation of E--S--O is that it misses the direct effect of E over O - an effect that becomes quite visible in a multinational company 7 . The possible inconsistencies between the putative "right" O, given S, and the E in which the O will exist are also not considered. However, an Environment is as much a "force field" for S as it is a "force field" for O. Local history, local culture and local institutions have a profound impact on O (see, for example, Redding, 2005, and Schneider and Barsoux, 1997) .
The local E will impact the natural way of performing together there. IKEA exhibits a flat, egalitarian organization, in which subordinates often question superiors and tangible symbols of power are rare. No CEO in search of the "right" organization for IKEA's strategy designed such features. Such organizational features emerged as a growing group of Swedes was building IKEA in Sweden. IKEA is, in this respect, naturally Swedish. Even if Ingvar Kamprad had intervened to design such organizations features, it would have been the Swede in him doing it 8 . Indeed, the "corporate culture" of local companies is, by and large, a representation of local (national) culture. Following E--S--O, in a given E at time t, the choice of the "best" S (be it s*) would determine O to be o* for best fit and optimal company performance. If o* is not natural in E -for example, certain features of o* do not fit the institutional and cultural traits of E at time t -the execution of s* would either turn out a different O, say o # , or added costs would be incurred in building o* (e.g., added training required to make individuals in E behave differently than is customary there). In both cases, what this means is that the company's performance will be lower and s* is no longer the best S. The "best" S could be s # , the strategy that fits the natural O in E. This is the mutual interaction of E, S, and O. Finding an optimal performance cannot be achieved without the simultaneous consideration of the three elements of performance, not a sequential one. Furthermore, startups apart, the company will have a pre--existing organization, be it o o . If the "best S" (derived from E) at time t is s* and the "right" O is o* (derived from s* in E at time t), there will be the need to change o o into o*. The added cost of such organizational change may be high enough so that the execution of s* will no longer provide an optimal performance while another S, s # , will exhibit a superior 7 In the Porterian world of "positioning", company performance is compared (explicitly) within an industry and (implicitly) within a country or a "global market" taken to be uniform across countries. This means that explaining performance heterogeneity is done within one E (at a given time) and therefore the direct impact of E on O is not observable. The E--S--O model will turn the same O for a given S, irrespective of E. Put otherwise, following E--S--O, a given business strategy is "executed" the same way in Sweden, in the US or in China. 8 The general manager is also shaped by its original E. Ingvar Kamprad is an exemplar of the cultural landscape of Småland (Sweden) in the mid 20 th century as Steve Jobs is an exemplar of California (US) in the late 20 th century. 7 performance if it requires a less costly organizational change. The interaction of E, O, and S brings path--dependency into company performance. Put otherwise: the performance we can achieve tomorrow is partly shaped by the performance of yesterday - something that E--S--O and its universal solutions miss. History matters for collective performance. The explicit interrelation between E and O shows up in Miller (1981) and the link between S and O in the so--called "configurations theory" which depend on the given E (Miller, 1986) . Miller further argues that of the many possible combinations of E, S, and O given to the general manager of a company, only a small set is feasible. Of this limited set of viable "configurations", only a very small subset will exhibit high performance 9 . Other academic contributions as well as testimonial evidence by practitioners have exposed the limitations of the sequential E--S--O model. The notion of S as "realized strategy" (Mintzberg, 1987) reinforces the impact of E on S through the "emergent strategy" component, but also shows that the shaping of S is a process, not one choice. This implies that O acts as a mediator between E and S (hence my choice of the order in the acronym EOS). Bower (1970) pioneered the view that strategy making is a process and that in large companies such resource allocation process (the shaping of S) was a political, bottom--up process dependent on certain features of the O (the "structural context", as Bower called it), chosen by the top general manager or CEO (unfortunately dubbed "architect"). In other words, the general manager shapes the O and then the "O", not the CEO, finds the best S in in a given E. The CEO will, of course, authorize S. Miles and Snow (1978) present a typology binding Strategy and Organization in a parallel fashion. The "prospectors", "analyzers", "defenders", and "reactors" are sets of S and O with different performance in a given Environment. This is tantamount to changing E--S--O into E--(OS). In a similar vein, Milgrom and Roberts (1995) reveal that S and O are mutually dependent by showing that features of S and O are complementary -that is, certain choices in Strategy are valuable only in the presence of certain features of Organization, and vice--versa, in the sense that the more of one, the more attractive the other. This implies that a general manager cannot design a superior performance piecemeal from benchmarks (picking the "best" features of each). No given strategy will produce a superior performance by itself. It depends on O. But choices on O cannot be made absent choices of S -and both are dependent on E.
8 Such view is later developed by Roberts (2007) : " [The] problem of finding alignment among the environment in which the firm operates, its strategy, and its organizational design is not one that can be solved once and for all. Rather, it involves an on--going process of adjustment as the environment changes, as the strategy develops, and as the organization evolves." Interestingly enough, Roberts' model still reveals E as an antecedent to S and O. The E--S--O sequence is still there, reducing the management problem to a design problem. However, Roberts recognizes that such design problem "cannot be solved once and for all". Each time E changes, there is a need to re--design S and O in order to keep the alignment that produces maximum performance. Such model of company performance captures the process nature of management but the dynamics remain essentially exogenous. It is a welcome addition to a Porterian view that dismisses O and it is grounded on the complementariness between S and O. It is a superior model of performance, but it is still a sophisticated form of E--S--O (see Figure  1) . It misses the impact of S on E, of O on E and, surely, that of O on S. It recognizes the effect of time but not path dependency. Roberts, 2007) In order to observe the nuances of the mutual interaction in EOS, consider the case of IKEA. Its business Strategy (S) is made of a certain offering of furniture and accessories for the home and office and a unique business model, often referred to as the "IKEA way", which includes designing furniture (of a particular minimalist style and in a particular approach, the "flat--pack"), outsourcing its production, marketing it via advertising and a catalogue, retailing it in large self--service stores with a particular layout, and letting the customers transport it and install it at their homes or offices. The value propositions of such S are manifest, namely to its customers and to its owner, and have made IKEA very successful over decades. In principle, such S could have been an initial choice consequent from its original E (the furniture market/industry in Sweden after WWII). But it was not.
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9 In fact, the initial S of IKEA was quite different. There was no flat--pack design, no IKEA store, no catalogue, no advertising, no transport or assembly by the customer -but there was already the proposition of value for money and a lower price relative to its competitors, a treasured choice by IKEA's founder. It took about fifteen years (yes, more than a decade) for IKEA to build its own "way". Many elements of the "final" S did not come from the founder (and general manager of the company for over three decades), but rather "from" the organization, namely through innovative actions by subordinates (designers, store managers, and so on) and certain interactions with the E (exchanges with lead customers, reactions by local competitors, relations with foreign suppliers, and so on). It is a well--established fact that IKEA's offerings and business model (its S) changed the market and industry of furniture in Sweden (its original E). Changes in the E occurred, for example, in customers' tastes and perception of value, in the intensity of competition, or in the number, size, and technologies of furniture makers. All evidence suggests that IKEA also had a noticeable impact on Sweden itself, be it on its economy or its image around the world. In other words: a chosen initial E gives shape to an initial S (through the intervention of the founder) and an initial O (largely shaped by E, as we have also shown above); such O then interacts with E, and reveal beneficial changes in S which may lead to changes in O; S and O will have some impact on E; this will repeat itself until S and O and E (may) converge to a demonstrated stable state for a while. Then E may exhibit some exogenous change and the search for a superior performance will start again with changes in S and O. A similar view of dynamic interplay is implicit in Teece et al (1997) , who presented three interrelated factors of competitive advantage: "process", "position" and "path". Processes (in O), including learning and transformation, position (in S) and path (i.e. the history of O and S), shape performance in a given E that changes over time. Superior performance in a dynamic E calls for incremental changes to OS ("learning") or for a new OS altogether ("transformation"). Some interactions in EOS imply changes of E. For example, the choice of outsourcing the manufacturing of furniture (an element of S) coupled with a reaction by the furniture cartel in Sweden (an element of E) to IKEA's low prices (another element of S) by imposing a manufacturing embargo on IEKA, led IKEA to source from Poland and to establish close ties with its suppliers there. This means that an element in E at a point in time (the competitors' reaction in Sweden) led to changes in S (offshoring and establishing partnerships with suppliers) and a change in O (namely a new structure and new skills) and a change of E itself. Such change is not a change of a given E (say, "Sweden"), but rather the move to a different E (say,
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"Sweden and Poland"), showing that the manager can have some direct control over E. The basic elements of the current "IKEA way", both in strategy and organization, have been the same for some four decades, though incremental changes in S and O continue all the time (such as home delivery services, for example) partly because IKEA's geographic footprint has not ceased to grow -a change of E -and partly because of changes in E - some exogenous, like an ageing population or changes in income per household, and some influenced by IKEA's S and O, like the growth of copycats or the re--structuring of local furniture industries around the world. Finally, the company is an open system and will have an effect on E. Again, such impact is not present in E--O--S. What a company offers to the market will impact the perceived value of customers, the expectations of shareholders, the behavior of competitors and regulators, and so on. That is, S influences E too. Apple, Ford, IBM, IKEA and Swatch are dated exemplars. Likewise with O: some locally new features of an organization, say a particular governance structure, "forced ranking", or high powered incentives, may in time diffuse through E and even become a norm there. GM, GE, and Goldman Sachs are dated exemplars here. The impact of S or O on E is readily noticeable if the company is a "game changer", i.e. disrupts its market or industry. A given S or O may even impact a wider environment. Some companies carved their name in stone by authoring an effect well beyond their industries. Interestingly, three auto companies -Ford, GM and Toyota -belong to such rare category. The EOS model A company's performance is a never--ending process involving its E, O, and S concomitantly. Figure 2 captures the EOS model at time t. 11 EOS is a model of company performance, not of the company itself. The separation between the environment (E) and the company ("OS") is largely conventional, given the open nature of companies. Each element of EOS impacts the other two elements and the whole, company performance. There are three features of such impact that are noteworthy. First, the impact is non--linear: a small change in one element may have a large impact on the overall performance (a feature of complex systems). Second, it is asymmetric -for example, the impact of E on S is different, and generally higher, than that of S on E. Third, it is a dynamic interaction: one element impacts another element which will then (not simultaneously) impact the first. Indeed the feedback effect can be mediated by the other element (for example, E impacts O, which impacts S, which impacts E). This is why the model shows two different lines with single arrows between elements (as opposed to one line with two arrows). There is another relevant feature of EOS for the dynamics of company performance. Each element (E, O, and S) exhibits a different rate of change (or derivative) over time. This is valid for each element's natural change over time (the "life--cycle" argument) and for its artificial change in response to managerial interventions. E, O, and S are not equally malleable in time. What I mean is that superior performance is not purposefully determined by seeking the consonance or fit between E, S and O at a given point in time, but by exploiting the inexorable and uneven dynamic interaction between E, S, and O. For example, a change in O at time t will produce a change in S later on (say at time t+2Δt), even if either O or S are changed in the meantime at t+Δt. Company performance is therefore path--dependent in complex ways. Put differently: history matters a great deal. There is no tabula rasa in company performance. Furthermore, EOS exhibits non--malleability. What this means is that a general manager cannot have any combination or configuration of elements in E, S, and O that one could imagine and wish. Only some combinations are feasible, as the various elements of EOS are real -they exist and interact beyond our will -and their interactions are non--linear and contextual -that is, how two elements interact depends not just on themselves but also on other elements around them (see, for example, Porter and Siggelkow, 2008) . Put differently, non--malleability implies that some choices of, say, incentive systems are incoherent with certain choices of performance metrics or may be dysfunctional at certain levels of performance, or that some choices of business model are unfeasible with some choices of organization structure.
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Enter the General Manager: M.EOS I have presented EOS as the model of company performance. Such presentation was done without the separate consideration of the general manager. After all, the general manager is part of O (say, Ingmar Kamprad was undoubtedly a member of IKEA's organization and so was Steve Jobs of Apple's). Furthermore, obviously but importantly, the general manager is also a part of E (say, both Kamprad and Jobs were also shareholders of their companies). The fact that the general manager is part of E is readily noticed in the case of multinational companies. Even today, a CEO with a passport that does not coincide with the company's country of origin is a rarity. One's own nation matters more than we usually like to admit in the context of business. In an extraordinary moment, Jeff Immelt wrote in page 8 of GE's Annual Report 2008 (quite a year for E): "I have also learned something about my country. I run a global company, but I am a citizen of the U.S." The remainder of the paragraph shows how his national allegiance has a bearing in his choices as the general manager of GE: "To this end, we [Americans] need an educational system that inspires hard work, discipline, and creative thinking. The ability to innovate must be valued again. We must discover new technologies and develop a productive manufacturing base. Our trade deficit is a sign of real weakness and we must reduce our debt to the world. GE will always invest to win globally, but this should include a preeminent position in a strong U.S." I wonder how many non--American managers of GE share the value of a "strong US" with their (American) general manager, specifically in a period of global crisis. This is not a moral judgment. I am just stating that it is normal (indeed, natural) for an American to wish for a strong US as it is normal for a non--American not to share such a superordinate goal. Prompting one's nation advantage (one's own E) may not foster a superior collective performance in a corporation where so many general managers do not share the same E at the individual level. This goes to the point that managers are also part of E. The normative point is that general managers need to take such belonging into account in order to raise their awareness of their natural inclinations as they pursue, after all, a collective performance superior to that which would be natural. Less obviously, the general manager is also part of S (yes, the company's strategy). Steve Jobs is not just part of Apple, he became part of what Apple delivers to the market. During a number of years, partly through and after Nissan's revival, Carlos Ghosn was treated like a folk hero in Japan. More generally, the general manager is a "symbol" of the company (Mintzberg, 1973) , and in this sense the CEO is part of a company's offerings. This may be more or less visible, more or less intense, but it is conceptually there anyway.
14 "CEOs". In many cases, namely of diversified multinational corporations, the ability to effectively shape the overall collective performance is beyond the capacity of any single individual and is held, de facto, by a top management team (or TMT) -though one individual may symbolically hold the title of CEO. M.EOS is a complex dynamic system with four first--tier performance elements or factors: the company's environment, its organization, its strategy, and the general manager. Superior performance will correspond to a state of dynamic harmony between E, O, and S, created by M. Managerial interventions are cumulative events in a process: which elements of EOS are modified by M matter and the sequence and timing of such modifications matter as well. This is a critical insight as we established that EOS is not instantaneous: an exogenous change in E, for example, and the resulting effect on S and O take time.
Likewise with managerial interventions: Though performance can be measured at time t, it cannot be managed instantly at time t. Put differently: performance at time t is shaped by the integral of managerial interventions at time t, t--Δt, t--2Δt, … t--nΔt -i.e. before t. A particular managerial intervention will have an impact--time (the time it takes for it to impact company performance) and a lasting--effect (the sticky effect of the intervention on E or S or O after impact--time). This is why management succession is a crucial moment. When a new CEO takes over it may well it that a predecessor's interventions will impact performance for quite some time - for the good and for the bad. This is another reason to carefully study the history of M.EOS, both the formative period (to learn about the universal core of EOS) and the recent years (to learn about the more recent managerial interventions), when starting as a general manager of an existing company. The aim of managerial intervention is to create a superior collective performance. his means shifting EOS from one state (EOS)L to a superior state (EOS)H. Such performance shift is not instantaneous. It is a process in itself and it takes time. Managerial interventions are orderly and controlled acts that make up a process of performance shift (not strategy change, not organization change, not environment change, but rather all of the above as a whole). As Mintzberg noted, managerial work is never ending (Mintzberg, 1973) . Even after turning around a company, there is no moment when the general manager can feel the pleasure of relaxing and saying "It's done" - simply because management is never finished. The pleasure of management lies in a deep feeling that one has created something artificial that is at least momentarily superior to what would be natural, but that special moment is not the gateway to a deserved rest. The dynamics of EOS show why. EOS is not static. There is no "equilibrium" that keeps company performance constant over time. On the contrary: EOS is always shifting, and naturally so (that is, without the intervention of the general manager of the company). The gradient of and socially natural there. Such attributes can be conveniently described as the "PITCH" of E (Santos, forthcoming), made of a particular Physical nature (a "geography", including its demographics and physical resources); an Institutional setting (economic, legal, political, educational, and so on); a Technological background; a national or local Culture; and, of course, History -as time and dynamics are of the essence here. A multinational company exists in multiple local environments at the same time. A diversified corporation exists is multiple business environments at the same time. The original E of the company has a lasting impact on the company's performance (Porter, 1990; Doz, Santos, and Williamson, 2001 ). There is plenty of evidence showing that when an economy grows or a market emerges, for example, even inefficient companies exhibit high performance (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1986) , i.e. high performance may be natural in a given E. General managers can change E in two ways, one directly and one indirectly. Managers can directly "move" the company to a different E by adding or removing one or more elements that make up their E (say, starting or ending a strategic alliance), or by adding or removing a location of the company (as when a company internationalizes and enters new markets). And managers can indirectly alter the existing elements of their E by impacting the behavior of elements of E: for example, an advertising campaign affects consumers' preferences; or lobbying deeds that alter government regulations; or still with a new business plan that changes the investors' perception of the company (say, from being a "value stock" to being a "growth stock"), which may even lead to a sale of shares by several incumbent shareholders and bring about new shareholders.
S: Strategy
If E signifies where the company is, the S signifies what the company does. The elements of S are: product, a good, a service, or a combination thereof; position, which implicitly specifies the product's application or value proposition for a particular set of customers; business model, which includes the set of activities that the company undertakes, the technologies it uses, as well as the linkages with partners and suppliers upstream and downstream 12 ; and resource allocation, which determines how capital and labor are distributed across activities. The Strategy in EOS is neither a dream nor a plan. It is what the company actually does -not what the company should do or wish it did. The S is the realized strategy,
